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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DIVISION
LT. GOV. PHIL BRYANT, in his
private and individual capacity, on behalf
of himself and others similarly situated
RYAN S. WALTERS,
MICHAEL E. SHOTWELL and
RICHARD A. CONRAD, ET AL., on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated

PLAINTIFFS

VS.

NO.2:10-cv-76

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official
capacity as Attorney General of the United
States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES;
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official
capacity as the Secretary of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY; TIMOTHY F.
GEITHNER, in his official capacity as the
Secretary of the United States Department
of the Treasury; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; and HILDA
L. SOLIS, in her official capacity as Secretary
of the United States Department of Labor

DEFENDANTS

PLAINTIFF, LT. GOV. PHIL BRYANT’S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Lt. Gov. Phil Bryant, in his private and individual capacity
(hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff”), by and through his attorney of record, who separately files
this his Response to Defendants Eric H. Holder, Jr., in his official capacity as Attorney General
of the United States; the United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”);
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Kathleen Sebelius, in her official capacity as Secretary of HHS; the United States Department of
the Treasury; Timothy F. Geithner, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the Treasury; the
United States Department of Labor; and Hilda L. Solis, in her official capacity as Secretary of
Labor (hereinafter referred to as “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss and would respectfully show
unto the Court the following:
I.

LT. GOV. BRYANT HAS STANDING TO BRING THE SAME
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS AS THE NON-STATE EMPLOYEE
PETITIONERS.
Lt. Gov. Bryant is filing this brief as a separate response to Defendants' Tenth

Amendment arguments, which are of a different character than their other arguments due to Lt.
Gov. Bryant's unique position as a state official who is using private party standing to bring a
Tenth Amendment claim. Specifically, Petitioner Lt. Gov. Phil Bryant, in his individual capacity,
brings an individual action and a statewide class or sub-class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
His claims allege class-wide unconstitutional activity on behalf of all Mississippi state employees
and is particularly well suited for 23(b)(2) treatment since the common claim is susceptible to a
single proof and subject to a single injunctive.

We wish to make clear, however, that petitioner Bryant has also joined the Amended
Petition in his capacity as a private citizen, and as such he has the same standing to bring suit as
the other private-party plaintiffs who originally filed this lawsuit. See Amended Petition, para. 190. In other words, should the court rule that there is no private party standing under the Tenth
Amendment or that petitioners have failed to state a claim under the Tenth Amendment upon
which relief can be granted, Lt. Gov. Bryant should still be allowed to proceed as a private party
along with the other Petitioners.
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LT. GOV. BRYANT HAS PLED “ENOUGH FACTS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR
RELIEF THAT IS PLAUSIBLE ON ITS FACE," AND DISMISSAL IS
THEREFORE INAPPROPRIATE.
A motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) “is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.”

Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).
Rule 12(b) (6) must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A court must not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim unless the plaintiff has failed to plead “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Sonnier v. State Farm, 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th
Cir. 2007). In ruling on motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the district court “accepts
all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re
Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 204 (5th Cir. 2007). The reviewing court must also
“resolve any ambiguities or doubts regarding the sufficiency of the claim in favor of the
plaintiff.” Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993).
A.

Lt. Gov. Bryant has private party standing to bring commandeering claims
under the Tenth Amendment.
Defendants argue that "the Tenth Amendment provides a right against commandeering,

that right belongs to states, not to individuals."

This assertion is wholly incorrect, and

misunderstands the fact that the Constitution consistently protects the rights of individuals, not
the rights of states. The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const., Amend. X. It is important to recognize that the Tenth
Amendment is part of the Bill of Rights, the purpose of which is to protect the rights of the
people:
-3-
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The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the
benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political
entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the
States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between
federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992). Since the Tenth Amendment is meant for
the protection of individuals, it is illogical to assert that no individual may have standing to
petition for a redress of grievances under the Tenth Amendment.

Whether the State of

Mississippi approves of the PPACA simply does not matter - the people do not have to tolerate
the complicity of the state and federal officials in robbing individuals of their rights:
Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States,
therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be
ratified by the "consent" of state officials. . . . The constitutional
authority of Congress cannot be expanded by the “consent” of the
governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether
that unit is the Executive Branch or the States.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 192. Thus, the Court specifically rejected the argument
that state governments could consent to and ratify a violation of the Tenth Amendment.
Defendants seek to take advantage of the inaction by this state's government in order to expand
federal power. However, because the Tenth Amendment is designed to protect individuals, Lt.
Governor Bryant has the authority to reject the state's inaction and directly sue for a redress of
his grievance.
In their attempt to elevate the "rights" of states over the rights of individuals, Defendants
cite to States v. Johnson, 652 F. Supp. 2d 720, 726 (S.D. Miss. 2009), in which this court
rejected the proposition that the federal sex offender registration law “requir[ed] State Officials
to administer federal law” because “a private citizen, acting on his own behalf and not in an
official capacity or on behalf of the state citizenry, lacks standing to raise a Tenth Amendment
claim,” citing only Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 143-44 (1939).
-4-
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However, the Tennessee case did not hold that a private citizen can never have standing to raise a
Tenth Amendment claim. Instead, the Court first held that “[t]he sale of government property in
competition with others is not a violation of the Tenth Amendment," and in rather confusing
dicta, the Court added, “[a]s we have seen there is no objection to the Authority's operations by
the states, and, if this were not so, the appellants, absent the states or their officers, have no
standing in this suit to raise any question under the amendment.” The only thing clear about this
"holding" is that it was dicta - certainly, the Court did not plainly state that no private person can
ever have standing under the Tenth Amendment.

Moreover, as discussed below, standing

requirements have been considerably relaxed since Tennessee Electric Power was rendered in
1939.
Indeed, there are quite a few decisions in which courts have upheld private party standing
under the Tenth Amendment, including decisions that directly address the Tennessee Electric
Power case. For example in Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, the court faced a challenge to the
Gun Control Act's 1996 amendments. 185 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 1999). Although the court
eventually upheld the federal legislation, it first undertook an extensive analysis of Gillespie's
standing to raise the claim. Looking initially at Tennessee Electric Power, the court recognized
that the government's argument that “any aspect of state sovereignty impinged upon by the Gun
Control Act is one that the State, rather than an individual, must assert” had “the apparent
support of the Supreme Court's opinion in [Tennessee Electric Power].” 185 F.3d at 700. The
court noted, however, that standing requirements had been relaxed since the time of that case,
and the court proceeded to examine Gillespie's standing based on modern standing requirements.
The court next agreed that the connection between Gillespie's injury and the constitutional
infirmity might be weak (stating "[i]t is really the State's ox being gored”), but then found that
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any such nexus requirement had been abolished in Duke Power. 185 F.3d at 701. Finally, the
court addressed standing limitation that a plaintiff "'generally must assert his own legal rights
and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'"
Id. at 703 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978). On
this point, the court looked to New York v. United States and found that the anti-commandeering
rights Gillespie was asserting were not rights of the state, but instead were rights belonging to
individuals. “[A]s New York explains, the Tenth Amendment, although nominally protecting
state sovereignty, ultimately secures the rights of individuals.” As a result, the court held that
Gillespie had standing to raise the Tenth Amendment challenge “notwithstanding what state or
local officials themselves may have to say about the propriety of the statute.” Id. at 703-04.
Other courts have reached the same result: “Although the Supremacy Clause and the
Tenth Amendment (both structural constitutional norms) directly regulate relations between
governments rather than the relations between governments and individuals, nevertheless,
individuals should have standing to assert constitutional protections derived from them.”
Gilliard v. Kirk, 633 F. Supp. 1529 (W.D.N.C. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 483 U.S. 587
(1987).

Other cases directly indicating that private parties have Tenth Amendment, albeit

reluctantly, such as Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n, Inc. v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1033 n.6 (11th
Cir. 1992) ("Because this court has said before that, if injury or threatened injury exists, private
parties have standing to assert Tenth Amendment challenges, we conclude, with admitted doubts,
that the Riedels and SCLA have standing to advance this Tenth Amendment claim"); Nance v.
EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 716 (9th Cir. 1981) (assuming questionable standing to assert Tenth
Amendment challenge); U.S. v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148 n.12 (5th Cir. 1979) (same),
abrogation recognized by U.S. v. Texas Tech University, 171 F.3d 279, 287 (5th Cir. 1999). In
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Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, the Eleventh Circuit granted Tenth Amendment
standing to non-governmental plaintiffs for two reasons. 666 F.2d 1359, 1369 n.16 (11th
Cir.1982). First, “during the New Deal era the Supreme Court granted such standing by
implication in considering the merits of the Tenth Amendment claims brought by private
parties.” Id. (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 637, 640 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 573, 585 (1937)). Second, the Supreme Court has expressly limited the
nexus requirement of standing. Id. (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438
U.S. 59 (1978)).1
B.

The PPACA's mandate accomplishes an unconstitutional conscription of state
officials by the federal government.
As for the substance of commandeering claim made by Lt. Gov. Bryant, Defendants

simply do not address it. The Amended Petition states:
Consequently, State employees are directly affected and
commandeered by the PPACA, since the law necessarily
substitutes the judgment of Congress and the Executive branches
of the federal government for that of the employees and their
employer, which is a State government, regarding the composition
of health insurance plans that may be offered to and accepted or
rejected by employees.
Amended Petition, para. 93.

The Amended Petition thus raises the issue of whether the

prohibition against commandeering (or "conscripting") state employees and officials extends to

1

In Gaubert v. Denton, 1999 WL 350103 (E.D. La. 1999), aff'd, 210 F.3d 368 (5th
Cir. 2000) (decision without published opinion), the Eastern District of Louisiana discussed these
cases but ultimately concluded that no right to private party standing existed, stating that "[t]he
cases granting Tenth Amendment standing to private parties have done so without confronting
Tennessee Electric." However, the Gaubert court did not have the benefit of Gillespie v. City of
Indianapolis, supra, which was rendered two months after Gaurbert. The published circuit court
decision in Gillespie, as discussed above, did not consider the dicta in Tennessee Electric as
dispositive but instead held that private parties do have standing under the Tenth Amendment.
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an interference by the federal government with the terms of conditions of employment by a state
with its workers.
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the boundaries of the prohibition
against commandeering, nor has it ever explicitly delineated the limits of state sovereignty with
regards to the terms and conditions of employment with a state. Certainly, this is an important
question, since the state has no shape, existence or power to act whatsoever except through its
employees. If Congress can interfere with the states' employer-employee relationship to the
extent suggested by Defendants and set forth in the PPACA, then Congress will have unlimited
power to direct the states to conform to the will of Congress, thereby making an "end run"
around the Tenth Amendment.
Thus, the Court has stated that Congress may not "conscript" the State's officers directly,
whether or not "policymaking" is involved:
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to
enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that
Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the
State's officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States' officers, or those of their political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no
case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such
commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional
system of dual sovereignty.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). The Court has therefore shown that it will not
allow the federal government to direct the work of state employees.
The Court has also refused to allow certain federal employment laws apply to state
policymakers. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court upheld the validity of a Missouri Constitution
provision that provided a mandatory retirement age for judges and determined that Congress’s
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Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) did not apply. 501 U.S. at 473. The Court
held that the state constitutional provision was at the heart of the Tenth Amendment because it
dealt directly with how states define and structure their governments. In order to avoid a conflict
with the Tenth Amendment, the Court interpreted the ADEA as not applying to “policy-making”
appointees such as state court judges. Id. at 460.

The Court stated that “Congressional

interference with this decision of the people of Missouri, defining their constitutional officers,
would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.” Id. at 460. The
Court’s holding emphasized that Congress was interfering with a decision of the people of
Missouri, not just a decision or right of the State of Missouri. According to the Court, “[i]n the
tension between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.” Id. at 459.
The PPACA directs State of Mississippi to offer health insurance plans to its employees,
and directs what those plans must consist of. Congress is therefore directly ordering the States'
officers to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. Moreover, Defendants must
acknowledge that health insurance plans are major "benefit" for employees and a major part of
their pay.

Thus, Congress is dictating the terms and conditions of employment for state

employees - up to and including the terms and conditions of one of the state's highest officers -the Lieutenant Governor - who is thus one of the state's major policy-makers. Congressional
interference with employment relationship between the people of Mississippi and one of their
chief constitutional officers has upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state
powers. Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, supra at 459-60.
III.

CONCLUSION.
State employees will clearly suffer a deprivation of liberty, in that they may no longer

exercise the discretion to choose a healthcare plan that does not conform to the PPACA’s mandates
either from their employer or on the open market. They will no longer be able to negotiate a major
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term of their employment contracts with the state. Moreover, by imposing the individual mandate on
state employees, Congress has upset the constitutionally mandated balance of power -- the
"compound republic" guaranteed to us by the founders. State officials like Lt. Gov. Bryant who
completely oppose this unwarranted federal intrusion for themselves individually and because it
represents a deprivation of liberty for all state employees will nonetheless be made to enforce this
federal program. Clearly, Congress has unconstitutionally interfered with the states' employment
relationship with every state employee, including policymakers, and Lt. Governor Bryant is entitled
to a declaratory judgment in his favor.

Respectfully submitted this day of November 15, 2010.
LT. GOVERNOR PHIL BRYANT

By:

/s/Christopher B. McDaniel
CHRISTOPHER B. McDANIEL

Christopher B. McDaniel, MSB #10711
Brett W. Robinson, MSB#10006
Roy A. Nowell, Jr., MSB#100768
HORTMAN HARLOW BASSI ROBINSON
& McDANIEL, PLLC
Post Office Drawer 1409
Laurel, MS 39441
Tele: (601) 649-8611
Fax: (601) 649-6062
cmdaniel@hortmanharlow.com
And by: /s/K. Douglas Lee
K. DOUGLAS LEE
K. Douglas Lee, MSB#9887
LEE LAW FIRM, LLC
22 Milbranch Road
Bldg., No. 100
Hattiesburg, MS 39402
Tele: (601) 583-4447
Fax: (601) 450-0152
kdl@leelaw.us
Attorneys for Petitioners
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document has been served using the
Court’s ECF system, on Monday, November 15, 2010 to the counsel of record for all
Defendants:
KATHRYN L. WYER
United States Department of Justice
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
20 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20001
Tel. (202) 616-8475/ Fax: (202) 616-8470
Email: Kathryn.Wyer@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for Defendants
Dated Monday, November 15, 2010.
By: /s/ K. Douglas Lee
K. DOUGLAS LEE

CHRISTOPHER B. McDANIEL, MSB #10711
BRETT W. ROBINSON, MSB #10006
ROY A. NOWELL, JR., MSB #100768
HORTMAN HARLOW BASSI ROBINSON
& McDANIEL, PLLC
POST OFFICE DRAWER 1409
LAUREL, MS 39441-1409
PHONE: (601) 649-8611
FAX:(601) 649-6979
cmdaniel@hortmanharlow.com
brobinson@hortmanharlow.com
rnowell@hortmanharlow.com
Attorney for Petitioners
K. DOUGLAS LEE, MSB #9887
22 MILBRANCH ROAD
BLDG. NO. 100
HATTIESBURG, MS 39402
PHONE: (601) 583-4447
FAX: (601) 450-0152
kdl@leelaw.us
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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